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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. THE SHARPS HAVE CONCEDED THAT THE JUDGMENT 
IMPERMISSIBLY COMPOUNDS INTEREST. THIS COURT 
SHOULD ENTER AN ORDER THAT WHITE PINE PREVAILED 
ON APPEAL WITH RESPECT TO THIS ISSUE. 
In their opening brief filed on August 27, 1990, White Pine 
explained in detail how the Judgment as supplemented by the Amended 
Order re: Defendants' Second Motion to Supplement Judgment and 
Motion to Increase Liability on Bond, entered by the district court 
on May 14, 1990 (the "Amended Order"), contrary to law, provides 
for the compounding of interest. White Pine's Brief ("WPB") at 
1 
12-14. Although the Sharps have denied the Judgment (as 
supplemented) provides for compound interest, they admit that on 
November 9, 1990 — five months after White Pine filed this 
appeal — they filed a motion in the district court to "amend" the 
Amended Order so the Judgment would not bear compound interest. 
Sharps' Brief ("SB") at 9-11 and Addendum thereto at 85-86. 
By Minute Entry dated December 18, 1990 (the "Minute Entry"), 
the district court granted the Sharps' motion to amend the Amended 
Order to avoid the compounding of interest. A copy of the Minute 
Entry is included in the Addendum hereto at "A". Even though the 
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the 
motion or make the Minute Entry,1 there is no question that by 
filing the motion, the Sharps conceded the Judgment provided for 
compound interest just as White Pine has contended in this appeal. 
The Sharps would have this Court believe White Pine just 
seized on some minor, technical problem that is now resolved by the 
Minute Entry. That suggestion is wrong for several reasons: First, 
White Pine specifically raised the compounding-of-interest problem 
Due to the pendency of this appeal, the district court 
unquestionably lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the 
motion to amend the Amended Order or make the Minute Entry. See, 
§ II hereof, infra. Since no order has yet been entered by the 
district court, no appeal has yet been lodged by White Pine with 
respect to the granting of that motion. Nonetheless, there is no 
question that the Sharps conceded that the Judgment and the Amended 
Order, contrary to law, provided for compound interest. 
2 
in more than one objection filed with the district court. Twice 
in conjunction with this appeal White Pine explained the problem 
to the Sharps: once when the Sharps sought to have this appeal 
summarily dismissed; again in White Pine's Brief after the Sharps' 
motion for summary dismissal was denied. WPB at 8-11. 
Second, rather than simply telling this Court they conceded 
the issue, it is apparent White Pine, following this appeal, sought 
a modification of the Judgment in the district court to avoid a 
declaration that White Pine was the prevailing party with respect 
to this issue. Because of the third issue in this appeal — the 
awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing party — it is 
obvious that such a declaration has significant implications for 
the Sharps. Accordingly, this Court should enter an order 
reversing the district court's entry of the Judgment (as amended) 
to the extent it compounds interest. Doing so would avoid the 
necessity of yet a third appeal in this case. 
B. THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE HAS NO APPLICATION TO 
THIS CASE. 
There are two reasons why this Court should not invoke the 
"mootness" doctrine. First, that doctrine provides that an appeal 
is moot when the present controversy between the parties is ended 
and "the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the 
litigants." Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989). 
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See, also, Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981). The 
judicial policy represented by the mootness doctrine is the 
reluctance of appellate courts against "rendering an advisory 
opinion," Black v. Alpha Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d 409, 410-11 
(Utah 1982). 
In this case, the present controversy between the parties is 
far from ended. The Utah Supreme Court has granted White Pine's 
Petition for Certiorari, see, 150 U.A.R. 28, and all the issues 
contained in White Pine's first appeal to this Court will now be 
considered by the Utah Supreme Court. Moreover, now that the 
district court has taken it upon itself to lift its previously 
imposed stay, White Pine is faced with the ongoing threat of the 
Sharps' presentation of yet another motion or order to the district 
court seeking to lift the stay in this matter. 
Second, even if the mootness doctrine were properly applied 
in this case, which it is not, there are numerous, established 
exceptions to that doctrine. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 
P.2d 1044, 1045-46 (Utah App. 1990). One such exception exists 
when an issue "is of wide concern, affects the public interest, 
[and] is likely to recur in a similar manner, . . . " Ld. at 1046 
(quoting In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1371 (Utah 1982) (quoting 
Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981)). 
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No issue is any more fundamental to the orderly administration 
of justice than whether a court has the freedom to grant relief 
that was never requested, never argued, and never explicitly ruled 
upon. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS POWERLESS TO LIFT THE 
PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED STAY. 
Point III of the Sharps' Brief, contained at pp. 12-18, 
addresses White Pine's argument at pp. 19-20, that the district 
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to lift or revoke the stay. 
Nowhere in the pages the Sharps devote to this issue do they 
present any authority holding or even suggesting that a district 
court has the power to lift or revoke a previously imposed stay.2 
The clear and explicit holding of In re Fed. Facilities Realty 
Trust, 227 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1955), that district courts have no 
power to revoke stays, is not challenged by any of the cases cited 
by the Sharps. Moreover, as pointed out at p. 19 of White Pine's 
initial Brief, the Seventh Circuit there interpreted a federal rule 
functionally identical to Utah R. Civ. P. 62(d). 
2
 Porter v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 790, 248 P.1077 (App. 
1926), cited by the Sharps at p. 14 of their Brief, contains 
language suggesting a district court does have this authority. An 
examination of Porter, however, plainly discloses that case was 
decided pursuant to a wholly different statutory and regulatory 
scheme than exists in Utah, and that the case is not applicable 
here. No other case cited by the Sharps even addresses the 
question of vacating, lifting, terminating or revoking an existing 
stay. 
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The Sharps argue, however, that in some way Utah R. App. P. 
8(a) abrogates the clear holding of Federal Facilities. This is 
not so. Rule 8(a) provides, in part, that a party may apply "for 
approval of a supersedeas bond, or for an order suspending, 
modifying, restoring or granting an iniunction during the pendency 
of an appeal . . . " (emphasis added). Rule 8(a) is explicit: A 
district court is free to suspend or modify an injunction, but is 
empowered only to approve a supersedeas bond. By its express and 
unambiguous language, Rule 8(a) is consistent with the holding of 
Federal Facilities that "the order purporting to vacate the stay 
in a cause already on appeal was void ab initio, and that the stay 
continued in effect." Id. at 656 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, this Court should explicitly confront this issue 
and rule that district courts have no power to lift, revoke, or 
vacate existing stays.3 
D. ONCE THE DISTRICT COURT SET THE INITIAL BOND, 
IT WAS POWERLESS TO ESTABLISH A NEW BOND AMOUNT 
OR TO MODIFY THE JUDGMENT IN THE WAY IT DID. 
The Sharps rely on the case of Osborn v. Riley, 331 So.2d 268 
(Ala. 1976) for the proposition that a trial court is free to 
3
 At p. 21 of their Brief, the Sharps seem to imply that 
either this Court or the Utah Supreme Court has in some way 
passively approved the district court's lifting of the stay. This 
is incorrect. Neither court has ever expressed any opinion 
whatsoever on the propriety of the district court's unrequested, 
unargued and unbriefed lifting of the stay in this case. 
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increase a bond amount at any time. This expansive reading of 
Osborn is not justified by its facts. In Osborn, the trial court 
entered an ex parte Order on May 21 setting the supersedeas bond 
at $5,000.00. Seven days later, on May 28, the Rileys filed a 
Motion to increase the amount of the supersedeas bond based on 
their contention the initial amount was inadequate. On June 6, the 
trial court modified its earlier decree and increased the amount 
from $5,000.00 to $20,000.00. See, id. at 270. The Alabama 
Supreme Court affirmed this modification because it was done during 
"the 30-day grace period during which the cause remained xwithin 
the breast of the court'." Id. at 273 (quoting, Ward v. Blackwell, 
269 Ala. 632, 634, 115 So.2d 41, 42 (1959)). 
The White Pine case, however, does not involve a question of 
a trial court's immediate modification of an initial bond amount 
obtained ex parte. Rather, it concerns the district court's 
authority to order a modification many months later after all 
appellate briefing of the initial order had been completed and only 
shortly before oral argument was held. Accordingly, Osborn is 
clearly distinguishable. 
In re Long, 93 B.R. 791 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1988), also cited by 
the Sharps, has nothing to do with this case, and is apparently a 
mis-citation by the Sharps. The immediately preceding case in 
Volume 93 of the Bankruptcy Reporter, Matter of Ridgemont Apt. 
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Assoc, Ltd-, 93 B.R. 788 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) does, however, 
address the question at hand. Once again, Ridgemont does not 
support the Sharps' position because it addressed Bankruptcy Rule 
8005 which specifically grants a bankruptcy court the right to 
modify its own orders, Id. at 790. Similarly, Venen v. Sweet, 758 
F.2d 117 (3rd Cir. 1985) only permits a district court to modify 
injunctions, a procedure expressly authorized by Rule 8(a). 
In short, none of the Sharps' authorities directly stands for 
the proposition that a district court has any pow€*r even to modify, 
much less to lift, revoke or vacate a stay once it has been 
entered. 
E. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ENTER 
THE AMENDED ORDER• 
Assuming that the Sharps intended to cite Ridgemont rather 
than Long (a safe assumption since the Sharps quoted from 
Ridgemont), Ridgemont stands for exactly the opposite proposition 
argued by the Sharps. The Ridgemont court held it did have the 
authority pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8005 to modify a stay it had 
issued because such a modification would address "not the Order 
already on appeal, but the bond required as a condition of the stay 
pending appeal." Ici. At the same time, however, the Ridgemont 
court specifically agreed "that it cannot modify an Order after 
jurisdiction over the appeal of the Order vests in the district 
8 
court. ..." Ld. This is precisely the rule stated by White Pine 
at pp. 22-23 of its initial Brief. 
Just as Ridgemont supports White Pine's position, none of the 
cases relied on by the Sharps provides persuasive authority to the 
contrary. 
For example, in Finst Dev. v. Bemaor, 449 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1983), the trial court expressly reserved 
jurisdiction to establish attorneys' fees and costs. Jd. This is 
directly contrary to the language in the district court's initial 
judgment in this case whereby the Sharps were to be awarded 
attorneys' fees only "after prevailing in any appeal." (R. 2183). 
Moreover, in Finst, the attorneys' fees and costs awarded were 
pursuant to the primary judgment because of the reservation. That 
case did not involve additional fees and costs incurred in addition 
to fees and costs already awarded. 
Dent v. Simmons, 61 Md. App. 122, 485 A.2d 270 (App. 1985) 
similarly involved the award of attorneys' fees in the first 
instance, not additional and supplemental attorneys' fees. 
Although the appellate court found this award proper, it wrote that 
the better practice in most cases would be to determine 
those issues before judgment becomes final on the case 
in chief, in order to avoid successive appeals . . . 
Indeed, the decision of the appellate court on the 
matters in chief may even vitiate the basis for an award 
of counsel fee. Under those and possibly other circum-
stances, it may be wiser for the trial judge to defer 
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determining the issue of attorney's fees until after the 
completion of the appellate process. 
Id. at 274. 
Thus, the best case the Sharps can find is one that reluctant-
ly permitted the trial court to award attorneys' fees for the first 
time, but not supplemental attorneys' fees as obtained by the 
Sharps in this case. The Maryland court enunciated sound policy 
reasons why even this was not a good practice. 
Those reasons apply with special force in this case. The Utah 
Supreme Court has granted White Pine's certiorari petition, and the 
propriety of even the initial award of attorneys' fees is in limbo. 
Because of the district court's actions in this case, White Pine 
has been forced to file another appeal addressing attorneys' fees 
the initial award of which may well never be affirmed by the 
Supreme Court. As recognized by the Dent court, this is a wasteful 
process which should not be encouraged. 
No Utah case has ever permitted the supplementation of a 
judgment of the sort performed by the district court in this case. 
White v. State of Utah, 137 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1990), approved only a 
reduction in a judgment to reflect an accounting reality. Besides 
approving only a reduction, that amendment merely recognized 
historical fact. 
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For all the foregoing legal and policy reasons, this Court 
should specifically hold the district court was without subject 
matter jurisdiction to supplement its Order in the manner it did. 
F. THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES 
WAS IMPROPER. 
As demonstrated by the foregoing, the district court's award 
of attorneys' fees was premature. Beyond that, however, it was 
procedurally improper, and its reversal is required. 
Nowhere in their Brief do the Sharps contradict, distinguish 
or even address the authorities set forth on pp. 26-27 of White 
Pine's initial Brief. Those cases require a district court to make 
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law where attorneys' 
fees are not awarded as prayed for in a parties' request for fees. 
It is undisputed in this case that the district court reduced the 
Sharps' requested supplemental attorneys' fees by approximately 
$25,000.00 and awarded them nearly $80,000.00 in fees, all without 
any findings whatsoever. The Sharps do not anywhere in their Brief 
dispute that this failure by the district court requires a remand. 
See, Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah App. 1990) (when 
a district court awards attorneys' fees in an amount less than 
requested, it must identify such factors on the record in order to 
permit meaningful review on appeal); Matter of Estate of Grimm, 784 
P.2d 1238, 1249 (Utah App. 1989) (the absence of findings and 
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conclusions on the issue of attorneys' fees compels remand to the 
trial court to correct that deficiency in the record) . This error 
is serious, because this court has no way of determining on appeal 
why certain fees were awarded and certain ones were not, or if the 
attorneys' fees awarded were reasonable. 
II. CONCLUSION 
Because of the district court's legal errors, its Order should 
be reversed* The district court awarded compound interest contrary 
to the longstanding and universal rule in this jurisdiction 
prohibiting such an award. The legal error was not corrected when 
the district court later acted without jurisdiction to correct it. 
The district court also committed error when it revoked and lifted 
a previously granted stay when that remedy was never properly 
requested, never briefed or argued and, in any event, not within 
the authority of the court to grant. The district court again 
committed reversible legal error when it entered its approval of 
the Sharps' disputed attorneys' fees without making any findings. 
In addition, the court erred when it entered these orders without 
subject matter jurisdiction to do so. This Court, in remanding 
this case to the district court, should instruct that court that 
White Pine was the prevailing party on all issues appealed, 
including the compounding of interest issue. 
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DATED: January // , 1991. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
By. fajJlL u\ 
Robert M. 
Glen D. Watl^ii 
Bruce Wycoff 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WHITE PINE RANCHES 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
SHARP, JOHN C. 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 870901621 CV 
DATE 12/18/90 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK JAB 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION FILED DECEMBER 5, 1990 AND THE 
REQUEST FOR HEARING FILED DECEMBER 5, 1990 THE COURT RULES AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND AMENDED ORDER IS GRANTED 
FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN THE MOVING PAPERS. 
2. COUNSEL FOR MOVANTS IS TO PREPARE THE ORDER. 
3. DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR HEARING ON THEIR CROSS MOTION 
FOR SANCTIONS PER RULE 11 IS DENIED. 
4. THE MATTER WILL BE RULED ON PER RULE 4-501 C.J.A. 
